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CERCLA APPORTIONMENT FOLLOWING 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN: HOW JOINT AND 
SEVERAL LIABILITY STILL THRIVES—TO THE 
SURPRISE OF MANY 
Ryan Brady 
 
ABSTRACT: Courts have generally held parties who are responsible for 
hazardous waste jointly and severally liable for that harm under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA). On rare occasions, parties have shown a reasonable basis for 
apportionment of the harm and avoided joint and several liability. However, in 
2009, the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
United States upheld an apportionment of harm based on a seemingly lower 
standard of evidence than courts have required in the past, potentially lowering 
the burden on parties to obtain apportionment. This article briefly summarizes 
Burlington Northern, as well as predictions from commentators on what 
standard of evidence will be sufficient for apportionment going forward. It then 
analyzes subsequent cases to show that courts have not lowered the standard of 
evidence required for a reasonable basis for apportionment under CERCLA. In 
fact, a few courts have held potentially responsible parties to an even higher 
standard than prior to Burlington Northern. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United 
States,1 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the 
issue of apportionment of harm under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).2 Generally, parties who are potentially responsible 
for hazardous wastes are subject to joint and several liability 
for costs associated with their cleanup. Under common law 
principles, however, a potentially responsible party (PRP) may 
avoid joint and several liability by asking a court to apportion 
the damages. To merit this consideration, PRPs must show 
they were not responsible for the entire harm. Prior to 2009, 
courts had only apportioned harm on the rare occasions they 
perceived “a reasonable basis for determining the contribution 
of each cause to a single harm.”3 In Burlington Northern, the 
Supreme Court adopted this reasonable basis standard while 
upholding an apportionment based on a defendant’s size of 
land and length of ownership.4 
In the years since the Court issued its opinion, observers 
have disagreed on the extent that it affects apportionment. 
Their opinions typically fall within three categories—(1) that it 
did not expand the ability to obtain apportionment; (2) that it 
slightly increased the likelihood of apportionment; or (3) that it 
1. 556 U.S. 599, (2009). 
2. See id. at 608 (addressing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006)). 
3. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 614 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
433A(1)(b) (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4. See id. at 618. 
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significantly expanded apportionment. In the years since the 
decision, however, lower courts have vindicated those who 
predicted it would have little to no effect on CERCLA 
apportionment. 
Courts applying Burlington Northern have maintained such 
high standards of evidence that no defendant has successfully 
demonstrated a reasonable basis. Moreover, some courts have 
even precluded the reasonable basis analysis altogether by 
holding that the harms were theoretically un-apportionable. 
Most commentators predicted at least a small increase in the 
likelihood of apportionment—a result unseen so far. 
Admittedly, both courts and commentators alike have stressed 
that apportionment is very fact-intensive. As such, it is 
plausible that a case with facts suitable for testing the new 
limits has not yet materialized. Whether or not this is true, it 
is undeniable that courts have interpreted the reasonable basis 
standard more stringently than expected. 
This is a positive sign for the future of CERCLA. Congress 
endowed CERCLA with the implicit “polluter pays” principle, 
and while joint and several liability is not explicitly referenced 
in the statute, it is central to this principle. Any expansion of 
the “reasonable basis” of apportionment cuts away at joint and 
several liability, and in turn the government’s and taxpayers’ 
ability to recover cleanup costs from polluters. A post-
Burlington Northern interpretation of “reasonable basis” that 
maintains a high standard of evidence, as seen in the lower 
courts, reduces the chances polluters will pay less through 
apportionment. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Under CERCLA, parties are liable for response costs 
incurred from the release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances.5 Specifically, parties are liable for “all costs of 
removal or remedial action, . . . any other necessary costs of 
response, . . . damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources, . . . and the costs of any health assessment 
or health effects study carried out under” the Act.6 Congress 
left the scope of this liability undecided. Courts have 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012). 
6. Id. § 9607(a). 
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traditionally defined it by looking to federal common law in 
holding PRPs jointly and severally liable for these costs.7 
In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., a court for the first 
time applied federal common law principles to the scope 
inquiry.8 Because Congress eliminated language providing for 
joint and several liability prior to the law’s passage, the court 
concluded that lawmakers intended for common law to 
govern.9 Accordingly, Chem-Dyne adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,10 which provides: 
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two 
or more causes where 
(a) there are distinct harms, or 
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the 
contribution of each cause to a single harm. 
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned 
among two or more causes.11 
In the years since, almost all courts have followed its lead,12 
including the Supreme Court.13 This approach has led to a two-
part test for deciding when apportionment is appropriate. The 
first step, known as the “threshold question,” is to establish 
that a harm is capable of apportionment as a matter of law.14 
Next, a factual inquiry must point to a reasonable basis for 
apportionment.15 Under this methodology, apportionment has 
been rare. Until Burlington Northern, courts apportioned 
damages in only four cases out of 160.16 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (1983). 
8. Steve Gold, Dis-Jointed? Several Approaches to Divisibility After Burlington 
Northern, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 313 (2009). 
9. See id. at 312. 
10. Id. at 312–13. 
11. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A. 
12. See Gold, supra note 8, at 313. 
13. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 
(2009). 
14. Gold, supra note 8, at 319. 
15. Id. 
16. Martha Judy, Coming Full CERCLA: Why Burlington Northern is Not the Sword 
of Damocles for Joint and Several Liability, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 249, 283 (2010). 
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A.  Burlington Northern 
In Burlington Northern, the Court addressed for the first 
time what constituted a reasonable basis for apportionment. 
The petitioner, a railroad company that owned a contaminated 
parcel of land, sought apportionment in response to a claim it 
was responsible for harms inflicted by a lessee. The polluter in 
question was a chemical distributer that leased land from the 
petitioner beginning in 1975, but had operated on a much 
larger, adjacent parcel since 1960.17 Throughout the course of 
its operations, the distributer spilled various hazardous 
chemicals on the land, contaminating the parcel’s soil and 
groundwater.18 The company attempted to clean up the site at 
one point, but by 1989 it had become insolvent and ceased all 
operations.19 The EPA and the California Department of Toxic 
Substances Control subsequently took over remediation efforts 
and sought cost recovery against the railroad parcel owner, 
Burlington Northern, under CERCLA.20 
The District Court found Burlington Northern liable but did 
not impose joint and several liability for all of the costs.21 
Instead, the court found a single harm capable of division and 
apportioned damages sua sponte.22 The court used a simple 
formula for this apportionment: (1) the percentage of the site’s 
area owned by the railroad multiplied by (2) the percentage of 
time the distributor operated on the railroad’s parcel 
multiplied by (3) the percentage of chemicals spilled on the 
railroad’s parcel that required remediation.23 This calculation 
resulted in liability for six percent of the harm, which the court 
raised to nine percent based on a fifty percent margin of 
error.24 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that 
the harm was theoretically capable of apportionment but the 
record did not establish a reasonable basis for 
17. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 599 (2009). 
18. Id. at 603. The principal contaminants released at the site were Dinoseb, D-D, 
and Nemagon. Id. 
19. Id. at 605. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 606. 
22. Id. at 606, 615–16. 
23. Id. at 606. 
24. Id. at 616. 
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apportionment.25 The Supreme Court then reversed, upholding 
the District Court’s apportionment of damages.26 The Court 
drew on the Chem-Dyne approach, determining liability based 
on “traditional and evolving principles of common law.”27 In 
looking to the facts of the case, the Court held that “detailed 
findings ma[d]e it abundantly clear that . . . no more than [ten 
percent] of the total site [was contaminated].”28 Furthermore, 
“it was reasonable for the [trial] court to use the size of the 
leased parcel and the duration of the lease as the starting 
point for its analysis.”29 The Court endorsed the District 
Court’s usage of two factors,30 but explained that the 
percentage of chemicals contributing to the harm should not be 
considered because it cancelled out by the margin of error.31 
Accordingly, the Court upheld the original apportionment of 
six percent.32 
The Court characterized these facts as only the “starting 
point” of the analysis.33 Yet the Court seems to end with them 
as well, as it mentions no other considerations. In fact, The 
Court cited the Court of Appeals’ rationale, which held that 
“divisibility may be established by volumetric, chronological, or 
other types of evidence, including appropriate geographic 
considerations.”34 As several commentators concluded, the 
Court thought the pro rata area owned by the railroads and 
the pro rata length of ownership counted as geographic and 
chronological considerations.35 
Yet, many questions linger following the Court’s ruling. For 
example, did the Court fully endorse volumetric, chronological, 
25. Id. at 607. 
26. Id. at 618. 
27. Id. at 613–15. The Court adopted Chem-Dyne’s use of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 433A for these common law principles. Id. at 614. 
28. Id. at 617. 
29. Id. 
30. The percentage of the site’s area owned by the railroads and the percentage of 
time the lessee operated on it. Id. at 618. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 617. 
34. Id. at 617–18. 
35. Peter McGrath, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v. United 
States: Defining Environmental Law or Changing It?, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 85, 94 
(2011); Michael Foy, Comment, Apportioning Cleanup Costs in the New Era of Joint 
and Several CERCLA Liability, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 625, 667 (2011). 
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or geographic considerations as grounds for apportionment? 
And what types of volumetric, chronological, or geographic 
evidence would suffice? Are simple formulas of relevant factors 
sufficient evidence for apportionment? Interpreting Burlington 
Northern strictly, the size of the leased parcel and the duration 
of the lease could be factors other courts consider in 
apportioning damages. Courts following Burlington Northern 
must ask what level of evidence it requires to form a 
reasonable basis for apportionment. 
III.  DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN 
As many cases have stressed, CERCLA apportionment is a 
fact-intensive analysis. In Burlington Northern, the Court 
based its decision on the pro rata size of the land area and the 
pro rata length of ownership. A few commentators believe this 
has not changed the likelihood of apportionment, and that 
such fact-intensive inquiries will almost always lead to joint 
and several liability.36 Others believe Burlington Northern 
reduced the evidentiary burden to a degree, but left in place 
the presumption of joint and several liability.37 Others say it 
relaxed the standard so much that apportionment will be the 
new norm.38 
A.  The First Interpretation: Commentators Who Believe 
Burlington Northern Did Not Change Apportionment’s 
Burden of Proof 
A few commentators believe Burlington Northern does not 
upset the strong presumption in favor of joint and several 
liability. Under this interpretation (the “First Interpretation”), 
PRPs seeking apportionment still must show that there was no 
36. Gold, supra note 8; Steve Ferrey, Reconfiguration of Superfund Liability?: The 
Disconnection Between Supreme Court Decisions and the Lower Federal Courts, 41 SW. 
L. REV. 589, 610–12 (2012); Judy, supra note 16. 
37. Kevin Gaynor et al., Unresolved CERCLA Issues After Atlantic Research and 
Burlington Northern, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11198 (2010); McGrath, 
supra note 35; Foy, supra note 35, at 658. 
38. Aaron Gershonowitz, The End of Joint and Several Liability in Superfund 
Litigation: From Chem-Dyne to Burlington Northern, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 83, 84 (2012); 
Mark Misiorowski & Joel Eagle, After the Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern 
Decision, FOR THE DEFENSE 14, 18 (2009). 
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concert of action, no multiple sufficient causes, and no 
synergistic effects of the waste. They must also show that 
there was no migration or commingling of waste in order to 
satisfy the standard. 
Steve Gold argues that Burlington Northern’s precedential 
impact will be limited.39 He argues that its unique facts set it 
apart from circumstances that would otherwise lead to 
apportionment.40 He also notes at least three legal safeguards 
exist for the continued presumption of joint and several 
liability. First, a concert of action theory would undermine any 
claim to reasonable basis.41 Specifically, “[t]ortfeasors that act 
in concert are jointly and severally liable for the harm their 
concerted action causes, even if their individual acts cause only 
part of that harm.”42 Second, courts may also deny 
apportionment based on the multiple sufficient causes 
theory.43 That is, when multiple harms cause damage, if both 
would have been responsible for the entire damage, by 
themselves, then apportionment is improper.44 Third, courts 
may find the harms theoretically incapable of apportionment 
(the threshold question).45 Gold suggests that if the Court is 
signaling that the burden of finding reasonable basis is lower, 
courts may respond by finding fewer scenarios theoretically 
apportionable.46 Because a court must first address the 
“threshold question” before it determines the factual question, 
joint and several liability is maintained.47 
Steve Ferrey also argues that Burlington Northern will 
present no change.48 Ferrey concludes that the migratory 
potential of a harm and its varying toxicities will still likely 
preclude apportionment in almost all cases, even if a court 
considers imprecise evidence.49 Ferrey does note, however, that 
39. Gold, supra note 8, at 311. 
40. Id. at 329–30. 
41. Id. at 337–43. 
42. Id. at 337. 
43. Id. at 346–47. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 368. 
46. Id. at 335. 
47. Id. 
48. Ferrey, supra note 41, at 610–12. 
49. Id. 
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Burlington Northern alters the assumption of joint and several 
liability by saying evidence need not be precise.50 But because 
the evidentiary standard still requires a “reasonable basis” for 
apportionment, the party seeking apportionment must meet 
this high burden, producing no change in apportionability. 
Lastly, Martha Judy argues that Burlington Northern will 
not change apportionment for several reasons.51 First, the 
Court only considered whether the ruling was supported by the 
record.52 Second, the small number of PRPs made it easier for 
the District Court to apportion the harm.53 And third, only a 
few chemicals caused the harm, as opposed to alternate 
scenarios where many chemicals cause synergistic effects.54 
According to Judy, these facts cabin the ruling and leave 
apportionment’s evidentiary burden intact.55 
B.  The Second Interpretation: Commentators Who Think 
Burlington Northern Lowered Apportionment’s Burden of 
Proof, to a Degree 
Several commentators believe Burlington Northern expands 
apportionment to some degree. Under this interpretation (the 
“Second Interpretation”), Burlington Northern lowers the 
evidentiary burden on PRPs to show a reasonable basis. 
Specifically, these commentators believe it signals that 
considerations such as volume and geography of the waste can 
provide a reasonable basis in future cases. 
For example, Kevin Gaynor, Benjamin Lippard, and Sean 
Lonnquist argue that Burlington Northern has “reduced—but 
definitely [has] not eliminate[d]—the prospects for joint and 
several liability.”56 Following Burlington Northern, PRPs no 
longer need “near certainty” for reasonable basis because 
Burlington Northern condoned the District Court’s 
approximation of liability.57 Furthermore, as also noted by 
Ferrey, the Court’s decision shows that evidence need not be 
50. Id. 
51. Judy, supra note 16. 
52. Id. at 286. 
53. Id. at 288. 
54. Id. at 288. 
55. Id. at 291. 
56. Gaynor, supra note 37. 
57. Id. at 11206. 
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precise to form a reasonable basis.58 Burlington Northern 
expressly adopted Chem-Dyne and therefore embraced common 
law principles as equivalent to CERCLA apportionment 
principles.59 Courts will now look to the Restatement of Torts 
for common law principles, as both Chem-Dyne and Burlington 
Northern did.60 This may reduce joint and several liability 
prospects, because the pre-Burlington Northern burden was 
considered greater than the burden under common law and the 
Restatement.61 
Similarly, Peter McGrath predicts that Burlington 
Northern’s adoption of Chem-Dyne principles will lead to limits 
on the authority of courts to impose joint and several 
liability.62 This will lead to much more aggressive 
apportionment arguments and more complicated settlement 
discussions in the future.63 Specifically, volumetric and 
geographic evidence may now provide reasonable basis for 
apportionment.64 
On this point, Michael Foy notes that Burlington Northern 
broadens the evidence parties may use, including volumetric 
and geographic data.65 Even though Burlington Northern 
adopted Chem-Dyne’s approach that “evolving common law 
principles” apply, the Court arguably went further than Chem-
Dyne, which explicitly rejected volumetric evidence as a basis 
for apportionment.66 And similar to Gaynor, Lippard, and 
Lonnquist, Foy also describes how Burlington Northern eases 
the burden by aligning it with the restatement.67 
58. Ferrey, supra note 41, at 611. 
59. Gaynor, supra note 37, at 11206. 
60. Gaynor, supra note 37, at 11199, 11206. 
61. Gaynor, supra note 37, at 11199. 
62. McGrath, supra note 35, at 94. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Foy, supra note 35, at 658. Foy is also the only commentator to hypothesize that 
the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern embraced the “margin of error” allotment 
the district court used when multiplying the apportioned harm by fifty percent. 
66. Id. at 658, 666; see also Gaynor, supra note 37, at 11206. 
67. Foy, supra note 35, at 653. 
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C.  The Third Interpretation: Commentators Who Think 
Burlington Northern Has Effectively Ended Joint and 
Several Liability 
Finally, at least two commentators believe Burlington 
Northern has effectively replaced the presumption of joint and 
several liability. Under this interpretation (the “Third 
Interpretation”), the burden of proof is reduced so much that 
no specific evidence is required, and either volumetric or 
geographic evidence is enough to show a reasonable basis. 
Additionally, courts may even disregard migration of waste, 
possible commingling of waste, and synergistic effects of the 
harm. 
Aaron Gershonowitz argues that Burlington Northern 
represents a fundamental change from favoring joint and 
several liability to favoring apportionment.68 A few other 
commentators note that Burlington Northern shows that 
reasonable basis does not need precise evidence.69 
Gershonowitz, however, interprets this to be an even lower 
standard, at which point no specific evidence whatsoever is 
required.70 In turn, he argues, PRPs must now only show what 
they are not responsible for in order for damages to be 
apportioned.71 
Gershonowitz also believes Burlington Northern eases the 
burden of obtaining apportionment because the Court divided 
the costs instead of the harms.72 Other decisions, including 
Chem-Dyne, which Burlington Northern professed to adopt, 
asked whether the resulting contamination could be 
apportioned among parties. If it could, then the cost of 
remediating the apportioned toxicity is attributed to the PRP. 
As Gershonowitz points out, however, Burlington Northern 
jumped straight to apportioning the costs of contamination.73 
Doing so eliminates any consideration for synergistic effects of 
waste, and the costs of commingled waste may still be 
68. Gershonowitz, supra note 38, at 84. 
69. See Gaynor et al., supra note 37, at 11206; Ferrey, supra note 36, at 610–12. 
70. Gershonowitz, supra note 38, at 121. 
71. Id. at 123. 
72. Id. at 121–22. 
73. Id. 
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apportioned.74 Therefore, PRPs may have a much easier time 
obtaining apportionment. 
Mark Misiorowski and Joel Eagle also predict the effective 
end of joint and several liability following Burlington 
Northern.75 According to Misiorowski and Eagle, the lack of 
regard for science, highlighted by a failure to consider possible 
commingling or migrating chemicals, suggests tremendous 
leniency towards apportionment.76 The Court claimed that 
these considerations matter, but noticeably left them out of its 
analysis. As a result, the authors posit that Burlington 
Northern represents a permanent reduction in the 
government’s ability to recover cleanup costs, replacing 
CERCLA’s principle of “polluter pays” with “taxpayer pays.”77 
IV.  CASES INTERPRETING BURLINGTON NORTHERN’S 
EFFECT ON CERCLA APPORTIONMENT 
Cases in the wake of Burlington Northern have so far 
vindicated those who predicted little to no change in CERCLA 
apportionment. Moreover, the evidence for a strong continuing 
presumption of joint and several liability is two-fold. First, in 
four of the seven cases to address apportionment post-
Burlington, the court held that the threshold test was not met. 
As Gold predicted, courts may be trying to protect joint and 
several liability by precluding a potentially easier factual 
burden by never reaching it.78 Second, courts have been 
reluctant to accept volumetric, geographic, and other evidence 
as a sufficient reasonable basis for apportionment. 
A.  Cases Where the Defendants Failed the Threshold Test 
1.  United States v. Saporito 
In United States v. Saporito,79 defendant James Saporito 
was held responsible for the cleanup costs at a metal plating 
74. Id. at 122. 
75. Misiorowski & Eagle, supra note 38. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 16. 
78. Gold, supra note 8. 
79. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (2010). 
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plant that he owned and operated.80 The facility, Crescent 
Plating, opened in the 1970s and “plated steel and brass 
objects with various metals such as zinc, chromium, and 
copper.”81 Throughout its operational history, chemicals 
routinely dripped onto the floor and corroded the concrete.82 
The facility’s manufacturing waste also included sludge cakes, 
which were stored in leaking bins outside.83 Waste not stored 
in the corroding bins simply collected in pools on the floor, 
ultimately migrating underground to neighboring buildings.84 
Having spent $1.5 million to clean up these spills, the 
government reached a settlement with all defendants except 
for Saporito.85 Saporito argued that “even if he [were] liable for 
removal of [the] hazardous waste, the liability should be 
apportioned.”86 The court disagreed, holding that the harm 
was not theoretically capable of apportionment, and that 
Saporito was jointly and severally liable for the cleanup 
costs.87 The court focused on the ownership and operation of 
the facility, finding Saporito operated the facility from 1997 to 
199988 and owned and operated the facility from 2001 to 
2003.89 The court also found Saporito personally owned the 
equipment responsible for creating the waste.90 Saporito’s 
ownership of the plating equipment was essential, because it 
was the only cause of the hazardous waste.91 The harm, 
therefore, could not be apportioned. 
As the court noted, this was factually distinct from 
Burlington Northern.92 In Burlington Northern, “the 
contamination of (the) total site could be divided among spills 
that occurred on adjoining parcels of land owned by different 
80. See id. at 1064. 
81. Id. at 1049. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1049–52. 
84. Id. at 1051. 
85. Id. at 1048. 
86. Id. at 1061. 
87. Id. at 1061–62. 
88. Id. at 1055. 
89. Id. at 1058. 
90. Id. at 1051, 1056. 
91. Id. at 1062. 
92. Id. 
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parties.”93 Here, there was only one ownership party, James 
Saporito, and a single parcel of land.94 By contrast, in 
Burlington Northern, B&B disposed of hazardous waste on its 
own property and an adjacent property it leased from two 
railroad companies, making multiple PRPs potentially 
responsible.95 Thus, the court distinguished Saporito from 
Burlington Northern because in Saporito there were no other 
PRPs that could be held responsible.96 The court also relied on 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that 
“when there is a single harm, apportionment is appropriate 
only if there are multiple causes.”97 Here, there was only a 
single cause: Saporito’s equipment and operations. 
Arguably, Saporito’s outcome is best predicted by the First 
Interpretation—those commentators who predicted Burlington 
Northern would have little effect upon CERCLA’s presumption 
of joint and several liability. As Gold predicted, courts may 
invigorate the threshold question in order to limit future cases 
to a potentially easier test.98 
Moreover, the court stated that even if the harm were 
theoretically capable of apportionment, Saporito has not shown 
enough facts to support a reasonable basis of apportionment.99 
Even though there was only one chain of ownership and 
operators, Saporito could have shown that the waste disposed 
of on his watch only amounted to a portion of the overall 
waste. Still, the court noted that “[d]efendant has not 
presented any theory for computing its proportion of liability 
aside from saying it is zero. Without any such theory for 
measuring the waste produced by his equipment, [d]efendant’s 
apportionment argument must fail.”100 
Saporito’s relevance is limited, however, because the court 
would not have apportioned his damages under any of the 
three approaches. Saporito simply did not present any facts in 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1049–50. 
95. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009). 
96. See generally, Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043. 
97. Id. at 1062. 
98. Gold, supra note 8, at 334. 
99. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. 
100. Id. 
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his defense.101 Even if the court followed the Second 
Interpretation or the Third Interpretation, Saporito’s damages 
would not have been apportioned. Saporito failed to show any 
evidence, much less a volumetric or geographic estimate. 
Although the Saporito court did not apportion the damages, 
under all three interpretations the facts would not have 
supported apportionment. (See Table 1). Thus, it is difficult to 
determine if the court used a different evidentiary standard 
following Burlington Northern. Based on its rejection of 
apportionment using the threshold test, the court’s approach 
suggests a strong continuing presumption of joint and several 
liability. 
2.  United States v. NCR Corp. 
In United States v. NCR Corp.,102 defendant NCR 
Corporation appealed a preliminary injunction compelling it to 
complete remediation work on a river.103 NCR argued that the 
harm should be apportioned, but the Seventh Circuit held that 
the harm was not theoretically capable of apportionment.104 
NCR was one of several paper manufacturing companies 
dumping polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into the Fox River 
in Wisconsin.105 Pursuant to an administrative order, NCR 
agreed to perform cleanup of the river, as did several other 
manufacturers.106 In 2011, after spending approximately $50 
million to complete almost all of the ordered remediation, NCR 
decided that it had done its share.107 When the United States 
and Wisconsin sought an injunction under CERCLA to force 
completion, NCR argued that costs should be apportioned, and 
101. Id. 
102. United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2012). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 836. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. During this time, NCR sought contribution from other PRPs under 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613, but was denied. Id. at 83637 (citing Appleton Papers Inc. 
v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 776 F. Supp. 2d 857 (2011)). The court even ruled that 
NCR owed other PRPs contribution costs, because, unlike other companies, NCR “had 
been aware of the significant risks of PCBs,” but merely accepted the risk of harm in 
exchange for financial gain. Id. 
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that its cleanup costs already exceeded its apportioned 
harm.108 
The District Court rejected NCR’s claim for apportionment, 
and the Court of Appeals agreed.109 Although the District 
Court found there was no reasonable basis for apportionment, 
the Court of Appeals held that the harm was not even 
theoretically capable of apportionment.110 The court followed 
Burlington Northern’s reliance on common law principles, 
specifically the Restatement (Second) of Torts.111 It concluded 
that facts in the case were an example of the multiple 
sufficient causes illustrated by the Restatement.112 
In spite of the multiple sufficient causes theory, NCR put 
forth evidence of its share of harm. To begin with, the 
remediation was divided into five sections along the river.113 
NCR furnished an expert and a model to show its contributions 
to the two sections in which it discharged PCBs.114 NCR 
estimated that it contributed nine percent of the PCBs in one 
section and six percent of the PCBs in the other.115 Therefore, 
at most, NCR argued, it should be responsible for nine percent 
of the cleanup costs.116 The court responded that even if NCR’s 
discharges were the only PCBs in the river, “the Lower Fox 
River would still need to be dredged and capped, because EPA 
has set a maximum safety threshold of 1.0 ppm of PCB.”117 
While the court noted minor evidence that the remediation 
would have cost a little less had NCR been the only 
contributor, this evidence also showed that “the expense of 
cleaning up the Lower Fox River is only weakly correlated with 
the mass of PCBs discharged.”118 Therefore, NCR’s PCB 
108. Id. at 835. 
109. Id. at 844. 
110. Id. at 839. 
111. Id. at 838–39 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, cmt.d, illus. 5, 
14–15). 
112. Id. at 839. 
113. Id. at 836. 
114. Id. at 839. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 840. 
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contributions were sufficient to cause the entire expense of 
cleaning up the river.119 
NCR Corporation is a good example of both types of evidence 
showing a continued presumption of joint and several liability. 
First, the court rejected apportionment with the threshold test 
by holding the harm theoretically incapable of apportionment. 
The emboldening of the threshold test was at least one way 
commentators predicted courts might protect the strong 
presumption of joint and several liability. Second, the court 
kept a high evidentiary burden for apportionment, suggesting 
in dicta that NCR would have been unable to meet the 
“reasonable basis” test. In fact, the court even cited Steve Gold 
for the common law’s joint and several liability for multiple 
sufficient causes.120 The burden suggested resembles the 
continued high burden predicted in the First Interpretation. 
By comparison, in the Third Interpretation, the 
commentators predicted that no specific evidence would be 
required of defendants trying to apportion damages, and that 
volume and geography would be enough for a reasonable basis 
of apportionment. Here, NCR did show volume—it provided 
expert testimony and a discharge model approximating that it 
was responsible for, at most, nine percent of the PCBs.121 
While the court did not exactly embrace the accuracy of this 
estimate, the Third Interpretation stresses that evidence need 
not be precise. A court operating under the Third 
Interpretation would have disregarded the multiple sufficient 
causes to find NCR’s volume estimate a reasonable basis for 
apportionment. Obviously, this was not the case. 
If the court had operated under the Second Interpretation, 
however, it is unclear whether NCR’s damages would have 
been apportioned. Under this interpretation, apportionment 
would be proper in an expanded set of facts, in which the 
reasonable basis test can be satisfied with volume or 
geographic evidence. Again, NCR showed a volumetric 
analysis, as well as evidence that “dredging costs would be 
lower if less PCBs were present.”122 However, under the 
Second Interpretation, the court may still have concluded the 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 839. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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multiple sufficient causes theory prevents the harm from being 
theoretically capable of apportionment. Indeed, this 
interpretation emphasizes an alignment of review with 
common law principles, and the Restatement as adopted by 
Burlington Northern requires joint and several liability for 
multiple sufficient causes.123 A court operating under the 
Second Interpretation would still probably have held NCR 
jointly and severally liable. (See Table 1). 
3.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, LTD. 
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, LTD.,124 the court held 
defendant Teck Cominco Metals (Teck) jointly and severally 
liable for any harm found at the pending trial, because the 
harm was not theoretically capable of apportionment.125 Teck 
had argued that if found liable for the release of hazardous 
substances on the Upper Columbia River (UCR), its liability 
should be apportioned.126 In response, The Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Tribes) and the State of 
Washington filed a motion to dismiss Teck’s apportionment 
defense and a motion for partial summary judgment on 
divisibility.127 The court granted both motions, holding that 
Teck failed to show theoretical apportionability, let alone a 
reasonable basis for divisibility.128 
Teck was alleged to have contaminated the UCR by way of 
its slag and effluent leaching metals into the water.129 As the 
Tribes and State plead in their Second Amended Complaints, 
“[f]rom approximately 1906 to mid-1995, Teck generated and 
discharged into the Columbia River certain hazardous 
substances in slag, as a solid form, and in liquid waste, 
including, but not limited to, arsenic, cadmium, copper, 
mercury, lead, and zinc.”130 The Tribes and State incurred 
costs cleaning up these hazardous releases, for which they 
123. See generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(2). 
124. 868 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (2012). 
125. Id. at 1126–27. 
126. Id. at 1110. 
127. Id. at 1109. 
128. Id. at 1119–20. 
129. Id. at 1112. 
130. Id. at 1116. 
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sued Teck for cost recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607,131 and for 
which Teck argued its liability should be apportioned.132 In 
rejecting Teck’s argument for apportionment, the court noted 
Teck was unable “to account for all of the harm at the UCR 
site,” and therefore Teck could not prove the harm was 
theoretically capable of apportionment.133 Because Teck could 
not show its relative contribution to the total harm, it also did 
not provide a reasonable basis of apportionment.134 
Teck employed three different models to apportion liability, 
all of which were rejected.135 Teck’s first model was a simple 
volume estimation, which considered the amount of metals 
Teck’s slag released along the river.136 Teck’s second model 
was a partially volumetric estimation; although more 
complicated, it only dealt with zinc.137 Here, Teck estimated 
the volume of slag within the top five centimeters of the 
riverbed sediment, and then estimated the rate of zinc release 
from that slag.138 It then compared that rate with an estimate 
of the total rate of release of zinc in the river.139 Finally, Teck’s 
third model accounted for all six metals plead in the complaint. 
It calculated the total mass of those metals contained in Teck’s 
slag and compared it with the total mass of those metals 
deposited by other sources.140 
Still, the court held that these models failed to account for 
the entirety of the contamination, which caused it to fail both 
the “theoretically apportionable” analysis and the “reasonable 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1117–18. 
134. Id. at 1123. The court does say that the defendant’s burden to satisfy 
apportionment “is essentially a burden to prove that it caused only some part of the 
contamination, and how much.” Id. at 1111. The Third Interpretation predicted that 
PRPs would need to show only what they are or are not responsible for to get damages 
apportioned. Here, the court says this almost exactly. In practice, however, the court 
abandoned this by requiring the defendant to account for the entire harm—a much 
higher evidentiary burden. Id. at 1126. 
135. Id. at 1111. 
136. Id. at 1111–12. 
137. Id. at 1112 (Theorizing by Teck that zinc was the only metal that could leach 
out of the slag). 
138. Id. at 1112. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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basis of apportionment” analysis.141 At first glance, at least the 
third model possibly accounted for the entire contamination. 
However, the court insisted none of the models did so, for two 
reasons.142 First, none of the models accounted for the entire 
contamination because the models failed to account for 
commingling of waste and synergistic effects, meaning the 
volume of slag was not necessarily proportional to the harm of 
the slag.143 Second, the models did not account for the entire 
contamination because the harm was also not limited to the 
top five centimeters of the riverbed sediment.144 
This evidentiary standard, under which Teck’s evidence was 
deemed insufficient, is seemingly more stringent than in 
Burlington Northern. In Burlington Northern, the Court 
upheld apportionment on the basis of a much simpler formula, 
and with no explicit consideration for the commingling of 
waste or its synergistic effects.145 There, the Court apportioned 
damages based only on the pro rata size of the contaminated 
parcel and the pro rata length of time that contamination 
occurred.146 Here, the court held all three of Teck’s models 
insufficient even in the face of more specific evidence, and 
faulted Teck for not considering synergistic effects.147 Because 
of this, the court in Teck Cominco distinguishes Burlington 
Northern on the facts. Essentially, Burlington Northern’s 
limited number of PRPs and limited number of hazardous 
substances rendered specific volume estimates and synergistic 
effects moot. 
Teck Cominco exemplifies the strong continuing 
presumption for joint and several liability—and thus the 
adherence to the First Interpretation of Burlington Northern. 
On its face, Teck Cominco looks like the best test case yet for 
whether Burlington Northern would ease the evidentiary 
burden for apportionment. Teck offered three models with even 
greater evidence supporting apportionment than defendants in 
141. Id. at 1117, 1119–20. 
142. Id. at 1117–23. 
143. Id. at 1123. 
144. Id. at 1117. 
145. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 616 (2009). 
146. Id. at 616–18. 
147. Teck Cominco, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
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Burlington Northern.148 If ever the courts would endorse 
Burlington Northern’s less-specific apportionment model, this 
might have been it.149 Teck Cominco is therefore instructive for 
analyzing whether Burlington Northern changed 
apportionment’s standard of evidence. Mainly, it suggests 
Burlington Northern does not represent much of a change, 
because both of the interpretations predicting a change in the 
evidentiary standard—the Second and Third—would likely 
have yielded an apportionment from Teck’s evidence. (See 
Table 1). 
For context, recall Saporito: the court rejected Saporito’s 
apportionment argument, holding that the harm was not even 
theoretically capable of apportionment. However, by looking at 
the facts of the case, it is clear that even if Burlington 
Northern represented a fundamental change in the law, in 
which apportionment was the new normal, the court would 
still have not apportioned Saporito’s damages. While the 
court’s reasoning tracked closest to the First Interpretation, 
representing no change, the facts of the case were not 
compelling enough to test how high the new evidentiary 
burden would be. 
NCR provided greater context. In NCR, the circuit court also 
rejected defendant’s apportionment argument, holding the 
harm was not theoretically capable of apportionment.150 
However, if Burlington Northern had changed the evidentiary 
standard as much as the Third Interpretation predicted, the 
court in NCR would have apportioned damages; NCR had 
furnished a model showing that they contributed nine percent 
of the PCBs in one part of the river and six percent in the 
other.151 Because the court did not apportion damages, it must 
have been operating under an interpretation more similar to 
the First or Second Interpretations. Under both the First and 
Second Interpretations of Burlington Northern—that either 
the evidentiary burden did not change, or that it was now more 
relaxed—a court would still not have apportioned damages. 
148. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 622. In fact, the Burlington Northern district 
court apportioned liability sua sponte. 
149. However, as the court notes, Burlington Northern dealt with three 
contaminants all released by the same PRP. Teck Cominco dealt with approximately 
200 contaminants and numerous PRPs. 
150. United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 2012). 
151. Id. at 839. 
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This was because NCR’s case resembled the multiple sufficient 
cause theory, liability for which is held to be joint and several. 
NCR’s facts somewhat tested where the new evidentiary 
standard might be, but it only showed that this appeals court 
did not follow the Third Interpretation. 
Finally, Teck Cominco provided even more context. The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington rejected 
defendant’s apportionment argument, holding that the harm 
was not theoretically capable of apportionment.152 However, 
Teck Cominco’s facts are compelling enough that courts 
following the First and Second Interpretations might come to 
different conclusions. Here, not only would a court operating 
under the Third Interpretation apportion Teck’s damages, but 
a court operating under the Second Interpretation likely 
would, too. Meanwhile, a court operating under the First 
Interpretation likely would not apportion damages—the actual 
outcome of the case. (See Table 1). 
Teck offered three different models to show how damages 
could be apportioned, all of which were based at least in part 
on volumetric estimations of the metals it released. Under the 
Third Interpretation, in which no specific evidence is needed, 
volumetric evidence is enough, and apportionment is the norm, 
a court would apportion Teck’s damages. Likewise, a court 
operating under the Second Interpretation may apportion 
damages, as well—apportionment is not the norm, but 
volumetric evidence is enough, and defendants no longer need 
“near certainty” for contribution estimations. Only under the 
First Interpretation would a court likely not apportion. From 
above, these commentators note the commingling and 
synergistic effects of waste as roadblocks for defendants 
pursing apportionment. Sure enough, these were the reasons 
why the court did not apportion damages in Teck Cominco.153 
Thus, not only does Teck Cominco adopt analysis similar to the 
First Interpretation, but the evidentiary standard employed is 
similar to the First Interpretation, as well. If the court had 
followed a more expansive interpretation of Burlington 
Northern, such as the Second or Third, it likely would have 
apportioned Teck’s damages. 
152. Teck Cominco, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
153. Teck Cominco, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
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4.  United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. 
This adherence to an interpretation of Burlington Northern 
similar to the First is also reflected in the fourth and final case 
in which the threshold test was not met, United States v. Iron 
Mountain Mines, Inc. Here, the government sued Iron 
Mountain Mines for cost recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 for 
costs it incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site.154 The 
defendant moved for reconsideration of its apportionment 
defense in light of Burlington Northern.155 However, the court 
held that “Burlington Northern does not constitute a change in 
law as required for reconsideration,” nor does it “add a new 
mandate that District Courts must apportion harm.”156 Once 
again, this court’s interpretation of Burlington Northern 
adheres to the First Interpretation of Burlington Northern, in 
which there is no change to CERCLA apportionment analysis. 
Nor should this adherence to the First Interpretation be 
surprising. After all, these four cases are grouped together 
precisely because they failed apportionment analysis at the 
threshold test. In each of these cases, the court determined as 
a matter of law that the harm was not theoretically capable of 
apportionment, eliminating the need (or opportunity) for the 
trier of fact to determine whether there was a reasonable basis 
for apportionment. As Gold hypothesized, courts might 
invigorate this threshold test as a means of preventing cases 
going forward to a potentially more lenient reasonable basis 
test.157 Indeed, the fact that four out of the first seven cases to 
address apportionment post-Burlington Northern rejected 
apportionment based on the threshold test is the first piece of 
evidence of a strong continuing presumption in favor of joint 
and several liability. As also discussed above and seen in Table 
1, the second piece of evidence is the evidentiary standard to 
which these courts have held PRPs seeking apportionment. 
 
Cases Addressing Apportionment Post-Burlington Northern 
154. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91–0768–JAM–JFM, 2010 WL 
1854118, at *1 (E. D. Cal. May 6, 2010). 
155. Id. at 2. 
156. Id. at 3. 
157. Gold, supra note 8, at 334. 
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Table 1: This table demonstrates the appropriateness of apportionment under each 
interpretation. 
B.  Cases Where the Defendants Did Not Fail the Threshold 
Test, But Did Fail the Reasonable Basis Test 
The other three cases to address CERCLA apportionment 
post-Burlington Northern reinforce the notion that the 
evidentiary standard for apportionment has not changed. In all 
three cases apportionment was denied. Although the 
defendants passed the threshold test in each of these, the 
courts rejected apportionment by maintaining a high 
evidentiary burden, which is consistent with the second piece 
of evidence seen in the previous cases. 
 
Apportionment 
in actual case? 
Apportionment 
Proper Under 
First 
Interpretation 
(no change)? 
Apportionment 
Proper Under 
Second 
Interpretation 
(relaxed 
standard)? 
Apportionment 
Proper Under 
Third 
Interpretation 
(large change)? 
Saporito 
 
NO (failed 
threshold) 
NO NO NO 
Evansville NO NO NO NO 
Iron 
Mountain 
 
NO (failed 
threshold) 
NO NO NO 
NCR 
 
NO (failed 
threshold) 
NO NO YES 
Imperial NO NO YES YES 
Teck 
Cominco 
 
NO (failed 
threshold) 
NO YES YES 
Ashley II NO YES YES YES 
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1.  Evansville Greenway and Remediation Trust v. SIGECO, 
Inc. 
In the first case to address “reasonable basis” for 
apportionment following Burlington Northern, the court 
declined to interpret a change in the law in Evansville 
Greenway and Remediation Trust v. Southern Indiana Gas 
and Electric Co.158 In Evansville, claims against the owner of a 
hazardous waste site, Southern Indiana Gas and Electric 
Company (SIGECO), were assigned to a trust, which brought 
suit for cost recovery under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.159 The 
trust alleged that SIGECO was responsible for contaminating 
two sites along the Ohio River with lead and PCBs, and sought 
to hold SIGECO jointly and severally liable.160 In response, 
SIGECO sought to apportion damages.161 
Unfortunately for SIGECO, it failed to marshal any evidence 
on its behalf for apportionment.162 Instead, it charged a fellow 
PRP, General Waste, with destroying its business records, 
from which it could have proved the source, type, quantity, and 
value of its materials.163 Because this information would have 
allegedly enabled SIGECO to show a reasonable basis for 
apportionment—and without which it would be impossible—
SIGECO insisted that the court apportion its damages. The 
court then briefly discussed the newly handed down decision in 
Burlington Northern, but declined to interpret how the 
decision would affect this case.164 Instead, the court chose to 
“hold a trial that (would) allow each side to present evidence 
relevant to its own and its opponents’ different interpretations 
of Burlington Northern,” and would also address whether 
SIGECO would be jointly and severally liable for all past and 
future costs.165 In the meantime, the court did not find 
SIGECO had shown a reasonable basis for apportionment and 
held it liable for damages.166 Prior to the trial, the parties 
158. 661 F. Supp. 2d 989 (2009). 
159. Id. at 993. 
160. Id. at 993. 
161. Id. at 1011. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1012. 
165. Id. at 1013. 
166. Id. 
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settled, leaving the court’s interpretation of Burlington 
Northern inconclusive.167 
Because SIGECO was unable to present any evidence to 
show a reasonable basis for apportionment, no court 
interpreting Burlington Northern similar to the First, Second, 
or even Third Interpretation from above would have 
apportioned damages. 
2.  3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co. 
In 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,168 the 
District Court of California held defendant R. Whittaker Co. 
Ltd. jointly and severally liable for harm caused by leaking 
underground storage tanks (USTs) at a California 
manufacturing plant.169 Robertshaw Controls originally owned 
the property and installed the USTs in 1942.170 Defendant 
Whittaker then purchased the property in 1955 and owned it 
until 1963.171 Imperial ultimately purchased the property in 
2006, knowing the property was contaminated with chemicals 
but unaware of the nature and extent of the contamination.172 
Imperial then brought suit against Whittaker under CERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., seeking cost recovery for costs it 
incurred cleaning up the site.173 In response, Whittaker sought 
to apportion its damages.174 
The majority of the harm was caused by the leaking 
USTs.175 Thus, at issue was when the USTs were leaking, as 
the court could then determine whose ownership coincided 
with this release.176 Both Imperial and Whittaker employed 
expert testimony analyzing the UST thickness, resistivity of 
the surrounding soil, and corrosion rate of the main substance 
167. Evansville Greenway & Remediation Trust v. Southern Indiana Gas and 
Electric Co., Inc., No. 3:07–cv–66–SEB–WGH, 2010 WL 3781565 (S. D. Ind. Sept. 20, 
2010). 
168. No. CV 08-3985 PA (Ex), 2010 WL 5464296 (C. D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010). 
169. Id. at *14. 
170. Id. at *3. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at *7. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at *3. 
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stored, trichloroethylene (TCE), to determine when leaking 
occurred.177 Imperial showed that leaking likely began between 
1952 and 1957, and continued through at least 1963 (the last 
year of Whittaker’s ownership).178 Whittaker tried to show 
leaking began after its ownership, in the late 1960s, but the 
court found that Whittaker’s testimony actually corroborated 
the leaking beginning between 1949 and 1955.179 The court 
held Whittaker liable for the leaking USTs during its 
ownership of the property from 1955 to 1963.180 
A second cause of the harm was TCE found in the shallow 
soil next to a maintenance shed, away from the USTs.181 This 
indicated TCE was also stored outside of the USTs, in fifty-
five-gallon drums.182 Although Whittaker supplied testimony 
that it did not use TCE at its facility, the court did not find this 
credible, and held Whittaker liable for the spills at the 
maintenance shed as well.183 
Whittaker tried to avoid joint and several liability for these 
spills and UST releases by arguing that damages should be 
apportioned, but the court denied apportionment.184 However, 
Whittaker actually used the same two figures Burlington 
Northern used when its damages were apportioned: the pro 
rata size of the contaminated areas and the pro rata number of 
years that it owned the land.185 In calculating the size of the 
contaminated areas, Whittaker claimed that evidence only 
showed it was liable for the contamination near the USTs and 
not the maintenance shed.186 In calculating the years it owned 
the land, Whittaker showed that the tanks were installed from 
177. Id. at *4–7. 
178. Id. at *3. 
179. Id. at *6. 
180. Id. at *8. 
181. Id. at *7. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at *7–8. A former Whittaker employee testified about working at the plant 
over 50 years prior. The court found his testimony contradictory on a variety of facts, 
and he was therefore unreliable. The court also noted that the furniture companies 
who owned the property after Whittaker would not have had a use for TCE, a chemical 
for testing and cleaning valves. By contrast, Whittaker—an airplane and missile valve 
manufacturer—had such a use. 
184. Id. at *8–11. 
185. Id. at *9–10. 
186. Id. at *10. 
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1942 to 2009, during which time it only owned the land for 
eight years (twelve percent).187 
Although the court recognized Burlington Northern used 
both of these figures to apportion damages in its case, the court 
distinguished Burlington Northern’s approach.188 With respect 
to the size of the contaminated areas, Whittaker was 
responsible for the contamination in both the UST area and 
the maintenance shed because the court had already found 
Whittaker used TCE near the maintenance shed.189 Then, with 
respect to the number of years Whittaker owned the land, the 
court noted that the defendants did not provide evidence 
showing the rate at which the USTs leaked.190 Whittaker’s 
figure simply assumed the UST leaked consistently throughout 
the sixty-seven years, when the only evidence of the rate—
admitted by Whittaker—was that the UST was empty by the 
time Whittaker sold the property in 1963.191 Therefore, the 
court found no reasonable basis for apportionment.192 
Imperial bears striking factual similarity to Burlington 
Northern. Both cases feature a PRP owning part of a parcel of 
land on which relatively few chemicals leaked consistently over 
a term of years. In fact, Burlington Northern’s formula for the 
pro rata land size and pro rata term of ownership, once unique 
to that case, seems rather appropriate for Imperial, as well. 
Had the court applied the formula, Whittaker should have 
seen its damages apportioned. Certainly the size of 
contaminated areas should not have reduced Whittaker’s 
liability, as the court found it spilled TCE in both locations.193 
However, the length of ownership may have reduced 
Whittaker’s liability considerably. Whittaker’s expert 
testimony suggested leaking may have begun as soon as 1949, 
and Imperial’s expert testimony suggests as early has 1948.194 
Even if the USTs leaked consistently from 1948 until 1963, 
and immediately stopped leaking once Whittaker sold the 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at *10–11. 
189. Id. at *10. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at *11. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at *7. 
194. Id. at *6. 
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property, Whittaker would have owned the property for just 
fifty-three percent of the time eight out of fifteen years). The 
court would not have had to consider commingling or 
synergistic effects because of the small number of chemicals 
and PRPs. Moreover, the district court in Burlington Northern 
did all the work for apportioning damages—calculating pro 
rata ownership length and parcel size—sua sponte.195 
Perhaps the critical difference between the two cases was 
the procedural posture. The Burlington Northern Supreme 
Court upheld the District Court’s apportionment on review 
because there was no “abuse of discretion,”196 but here the case 
was decided in District Court. Had the court apportioned 
damages, perhaps a reviewing court would have upheld the 
ruling, as did Burlington Northern. In fact, Martha Judy 
cabined Burlington Northern as simply the result of the federal 
standard of review, saying: 
At root, this decision is about the standard of review that 
appellate courts may use when reviewing district court 
decisions apportioning harm among jointly and severally liable 
parties. Justice Stevens assumed that there was a reasonable 
basis for apportioning the harm and only looked to whether the 
district court’s decision was reasonably supported by the 
record.197 
Overall, Imperial’s high evidentiary standard bears the 
greatest resemblance to the First Interpretation, in which 
Burlington Northern’s simple formula for apportionment does 
not signal a new standard. Quite literally, the Imperial court 
rejected extending this formula beyond Burlington Northern. 
By comparison, under the Second Interpretation, the court 
would likely have apportioned Whittaker’s damages. 
Whittaker followed Burlington Northern’s lead by showing 
volume of contribution via its ownership duration. Although 
Whittaker’s estimation was not completely certain because it 
had to assume the USTs leaked TCE at the same rate 
continuously198, the second set of commentators note that 
195. See generally, United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos. CV-
F-92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047 (E. D. 
Cal. May 4, 2009). 
196. Judy, supra note 16, at 286–90. 
197. Judy, supra note 16, at 286. 
198. Imperial, supra note 168, at 7. 
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Burlington Northern did not require complete certainty. 
Finally, under the Third Interpretation, in which 
apportionment is the new normal, Whittaker’s formula clearly 
would have satisfied this low evidentiary burden. 
3.  PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC 
Finally, in PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston, 
LLC, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District 
Court holding defendant PCS Nitrogen jointly and severally 
liable for all of the harm at its former site of operations in 
South Carolina.199 PCS, formerly known as Columbia Nitrogen 
Corporation, purchased the site from Planters Fertilizer & 
Phosphate Co. (Planters) in 1966, operating a plant on the site 
until 1972.200 Prior to that, Planters operated on the site from 
1906 to 1966, during which time it disposed of pyrite slag 
containing arsenic and lead, as well as lead sludge that 
leached sulfuric acid.201 When defendant PCS took over in 
1966, it discontinued the production of pyrite slag, but 
continued to dispose of other hazardous substances on the 
property.202 
For example, PCS’s normal production generated dust 
containing arsenic and lead, deposited at the site.203 PCS also 
operated acid chambers, from which it frequently needed to 
clean out sludge material.204 To do so, PCS cut a hole at the 
base of the chambers and hosed the sludge first onto the 
ground, then into a ditch along the Ashley River.205 PCS hosed 
the sludge out using a mixture of lead and acid.206 PCS 
eventually demolished one of its plants in 1971 and sold the 
entire property to other owners in 1985.207 When Ashley II of 
199. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, upholding Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 2011 
WL 2119234 (D. S. C. 2013) (minus set-offs PCS has already paid). 
200. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444 
(2011). 
201. Id. at 441. 
202. Id. at 448. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 448–49. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 452. 
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Charleston, Inc. (Ashley) acquired the property in 2002, it 
began remedial work on the site, and sued PCS and others for 
cost recovery under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.208 PCS 
was held jointly and severally liable for the harm, but after the 
Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern, it filed a 
motion for reconsideration.209 
The District Court rejected PCS’s argument for 
apportionment because PCS failed to show a reasonable basis 
that accounted for both the volume and spread of the 
contamination.210 Because the volume and spread “were the 
two main factors contributing to the remediation costs,” the 
District Court held that “any reasonable apportionment of the 
remediation costs would have to take into account both of these 
factors.”211 PCS needed to account for the spread of the 
contamination, in particular, because “the fact that 
contamination was mixed up with clean soil increased the 
volume of soil that had to be removed.212 
This requirement seemingly departs from Burlington 
Northern, which did not consider the spread of contamination 
in upholding apportionment. In fact, PCS asserted this same 
argument, claiming Burlington Northern required a mere 
“rough calculation.”213 In distinguishing the two cases, the 
district court concluded that in Burlington Northern, the 
spread was not a factor affecting remediation costs because 
there was no evidence of earth moving activities.214 Here, 
several factors, including the plant demolition, commingled the 
contaminated and uncontaminated soil, increasing the cost of 
remediation.215 
On appeal, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
court noted that although Burlington Northern allowed simple 
considerations to form a reasonable basis for apportionment, it 
“neither mandates these ‘simplest of considerations,’ nor 
208. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, 2011 WL 2119234, supra note 199. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at *7. 
211. Id. at *5. 
212. Id. at *7. 
213. Id. at *8. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at *6. 
                                               
31
Brady: CERCLA Apportionment Following <i>Burlington Northern</i>: How Jo
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
172 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:1 
establishes their presumptive propriety in every case.”216 The 
court concluded by saying that PCS simply failed to provide 
reliable evidence informing apportionment.217 
However, PCS had offered five different models to show a 
reasonable basis for apportionment. Despite the court’s 
reassurance that PCS could use a combination of these models 
to show both the volume and spread of contamination, the 
District and Appeals courts rejected all five for failing to 
account for the contamination spread.218 
In the first method, PCS calculated the amount of fill 
material added to the land by each successive owner by 
analyzing aerial photography that captured changes in 
elevation of the remediation area.219 Doing so, PCS contended, 
would estimate the volume of contamination, as well as the 
spread across the site.220 The District Court rejected this 
method for several reasons, including the wrongful assumption 
that all changes in elevation related to disposal of waste.221 
In the second method, PCS used stoichiometry to measure 
the volume of contamination added to the site by both PCS and 
Planters.222 The District Court accepted this method for 
potentially estimating the volume produced by PCS and 
Planters.223 However, the court held that this method 
wrongfully assumed all waste generated at the site was 
deposited at the site.224 Furthermore, the second method still 
failed to account for the spread of the contamination.225 
The third method borrowed from Burlington Northern by 
using the years PCS and Planters operated the plant, 
apportioning pro rata.226 However, the District Court again 
distinguished Burlington Northern, saying this was 
appropriate only for that case in which only one party operated 
216. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 714 F.3d 161 at 183. 
217. Id. 
218. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, 2011 WL 2119234, supra note 199, at *9; see 
generally, PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 714 F.3d at 167. 
219. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, supra note 199, at *9. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at *10. 
222. Id. at *11. 
223. Id. at *11–12. 
224. Id. at *12. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at *12. 
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on the site. Here, with multiple operators, PCS failed to 
account for different production levels, whereas in Burlington 
Northern production could be assumed constant because of just 
one operator.227 Nor does this method account for the 
contamination spread, the court held.228 
In the fourth method, PCS performed “impact analysis” to 
determine soil disturbance using the same aerial photography 
from the first method.229 Although the method could show 
when earth-moving activities occurred—i.e., activities that 
caused the spread of contamination—it failed to show how the 
spread was affected.230 
In the fifth and final method, PCS measured contamination 
based on soil samples taken in a grid pattern across the entire 
site. An independent party conducted the sampling, taken 
every fifty feet in highly contaminated areas, and every 100 
feet across the rest of the site.231 The EPA also borrowed the 
results of this sampling to estimate the total volume of 
contamination at the site.232 However, the District Court 
rejected this method for several reasons. First, the court 
considered the EPA’s volume calculation for each party 
unreliable because it divided the number of soil samples 
attributable to each party by the total number of contaminated 
soil samples.233 Second, the denser sampling grid in certain 
areas was an improper method for estimating the total volume 
of contaminated soil.234 Third, it would be improper for PCS to 
use aerial photography to attribute soil samples to certain 
owners because earth-moving activities may have still 
occurred.235 And fourth, two of the samples were attributed to 
multiple parties, making it unreliable.236 
The District Court seemed overly critical in reviewing this 
fifth method, which arguably did account for both the volume 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at *13. 
229. Id. at *14. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at *16. 
232. Id. at *15. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at *16. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
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and spread of contamination. It is unclear why the court found 
fault with the EPA’s volume calculations for each party, 
because the EPA appeared to properly extrapolate each 
concentration contour from individual samples.237 Also, the 
denser grid pattern in higher-contaminated areas would 
ostensibly measure volume for those areas more accurately, 
not less. And if the court favored an evenly spaced grid 
pattern, it could have simply removed the extra samples in 
between the 100 feet increments. 
At any rate, PCS should not have needed this fifth method 
to approximate volume—only spread. After all, the District 
Court did accept the second method for estimating volume238, 
and the court previously stated that PCS “may combine a 
reasonable method for measuring contaminant volume with a 
reasonable method for measuring the spread of 
contaminants.”239 Lastly, the importance of the double 
attribution of two samples seems overblown given the 
hundreds of samples collected every 100 feet over the forty-
three acres of land.240 Because this court reiterated that only a 
“rough calculation is all that is required to prove 
divisibility,”241 two inconclusive samples out of hundreds 
should not have jeopardized apportionment. 
Given PCS’s level of evidence combining all the various 
methods, any court operating under the Second or Third 
Interpretation would have apportioned damages. Both of these 
interpretations suggest that evidence of volume of 
contamination is enough to form a reasonable basis for 
apportionment, which the District Court admitted that PCS 
showed.242 In fact, PCS may have been able to meet the 
evidentiary burden for apportionment under the First 
Interpretation as well, which posits that there will be little to 
no change in the evidentiary burden facing parties seeking 
apportionment. Thus, the court imposed an evidentiary 
standard even higher than the existing standard. Given that 
most commentators thought Burlington Northern would reduce 
237. Id. at *15. 
238. Id. at *12. 
239. Id. at *5. 
240. Id. at *16; Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (2011). 
241. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC, 2011 WL 2119234, supra note 199, at *8. 
242. Id. at *11–12. 
                                               
34
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol4/iss1/7
2014] CERCLA APPORTIONMENT FOLLOWING BURLINGTON N. 175 
or maintain the evidentiary burden, the result in this case is 
stunning.243 
Under the First Interpretation, apportionment still requires 
specific facts in the record. Apportionment often requires 
evidence of the total amount of substances disposed, and the 
defendant’s share of that amount.244 Further, commingling and 
migratory potential of waste are inevitable hurdles to proving 
a reasonable basis for apportionment.245 If the court 
hypothetically followed the First Interpretation, the waste’s 
migration would still be the sticking point in Ashley II. If the 
court found that the soil samples accurately tracked the 
migrating contamination—as it should have—then the court 
should have apportioned PCS’s damages. However, because it 
did not find a reasonable basis for apportionment, even when 
PCS presented evidence for the waste’s migration, the court 
employed an even stricter evidentiary standard for 
apportionment than the First Interpretation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
All of these lower court cases post-Burlington Northern 
suggest a continuing strong presumption of joint and several 
liability. As stated, the evidence for this is two-fold. First, in 
four of the seven cases, the courts kicked out the 
apportionment argument on the threshold question, holding 
that the harm was not theoretically capable of apportionment. 
Second, in dicta to those cases, and in the holdings in the other 
three cases, the courts applied a high evidentiary burden in 
finding no reasonable basis of apportionment. In fact, in at 
least one of the cases, the evidentiary burden was so high that 
it was arguably stricter than the pre-Burlington Northern 
approach. 
Commentators had a variety of interpretations for what 
Burlington Northern meant for CERCLA apportionment going 
forward, but these decisions now signal the answer. 
Specifically, the First Interpretation has proved most similar 
to how lower courts have individually interpreted Burlington 
243. This decision is arguably a reaction against the expected reduction in the 
evidentiary burden by Burlington Northern. 
244. Gold, supra note 8, at 330–31. 
245. Ferrey, supra note 36, at 611–12. 
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Northern. That interpretation predicted that Burlington 
Northern would have no change in the likelihood of 
apportionment; that the evidentiary burden would remain 
high; and that courts might even reinvigorate the threshold 
test to limit apportionment arguments from going forward. 
The results so far could not be more on point. 
Again, this is a positive sign for the future of CERCLA. The 
“polluter pays” principle is central to CERCLA’s 
effectiveness—and solvency. And central to the “polluter pays” 
principle is the unwritten but implied joint and several 
liability for PRPs. The potential increase in likelihood of 
apportionment would save PRPs from joint and several 
liability, and with it the consequences of their actions. By 
maintaining a high evidentiary burden for apportionment and 
reinvigorating apportionment’s threshold question, courts 
protect CERCLA’s joint and several liability and keep the 
polluters paying. 
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